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Abstract
Fully cooperative multiagent systems—those in
which agents share a joint utility model—is of
special interestinAI.Akeyproblemisthatofen-
suringthattheactionsofindividualagentsareco-
ordinated, especially in settingswhere the agents
are autonomous decision makers. We investigate
approaches to learning coordinated strategies in
stochastic domains where an agent’s actions are
not directly observable by others. Much recent
work in game theory has adopted a Bayesian
learningperspective to the more general problem
of equilibriumselection, but tends toassume that
actions can be observed. We discuss the special
problems that arise when actions are not observ-
able, including effects on rates of convergence,
and the effect of action failure probabilities and
asymmetries. We also use likelihood estimates
as a means of generalizing ﬁctitious play learn-
ingmodels inoursetting. Finally,we proposethe
use ofmaximum likelihoodas a means ofremov-
ing strategies from consideration, with the aim
of convergence to a conventional equilibrium, at
which point learning and deliberation can cease.
1 Introduction
The design of systems of multiple autonomous agents that
interact in various ways (pursuing their own ends or com-
patiblegoals)hasattractedagreat dealofattentioninAI.Of
special interestare systemsinwhichindividualagentsshare
thesame goalsorutilityfunction—insuchfullycooperative
settings,theagentscollectivelyact towardcommondesired
ends. While more general problems involving the interac-
tion of potentially self-interested agents have received the
bulk of attention in distributed AI, fully cooperative prob-
lemsnaturallyariseintaskdistribution. Forexample, auser
mightassignsomenumberofautonomousmobilerobots,or
perhaps software agents, to some task, all of which should
share the same utility function (namely, that of the user).
For certain purposes, it may make sense to model a busi-
ness or organization in a similar way.
A key difﬁculty in cooperative multiagent systems is that
of ensuring that the actions of individual agents are coor-
dinated so that the shared goals are achieved efﬁciently.
This is especially important in settings where the agents
are autonomous decision makers (and preprogrammed co-
ordinated strategies are not available), as in the situations
mentioned above. One natural way to view the coordina-
tion problem is as a
n-person cooperative game. From the
perspective of game theory, we are interested in
n-person
games in which the players have a shared or joint utility
function; that is, any outcome of the game has equal value
for all players.
In this paper, we study aspects of the coordinationproblem
from the perspective of
n-player repeated games. A set of
agents ﬁnd themselves in a situation which requires coor-
dinated action(viewed as a single-stage decisionproblem),
but can encounter this situation repeatedly.
1 Methods such
as allowing agents to communicate their intentionsbefore-
hand or imposing speciﬁc behaviors (e.g., by means of a
central controlleror the use of social laws) may ensure that
agents behave in a coordinated fashion. However, our in-
terest in thispaper is in methods that enable agents tolearn
their component of a coordinated policy through repeated
experience with the game situation.
Learningtechniqueshavebeenwell-studiedingametheory,
not onlyfor coordinationincooperative games, but also for
the more general problem of equilibrium selection [12, 5].
Models applied to this problem include ﬁctitious play [13]
and Bayesian best-response methods [8, 19, 4] (evolution-
ary models have also attracted a great deal of attention [1,
11]). These have especially nice behavior in coordination
problems [19]. However, these models tend to assume that
each agent can observe the exact action performed by all
others at each interaction. Such action observable scenar-
1Thisscenarioisappealinginitssimplicity, butisnotanoverly
realistic picture of multiagent decision problems. However, our
interest in repeated single-stage games is motivated by a decom-
position of sequential cooperative problems (see below).ioswilllikelyberareinpractice,especiallywhenindividual
actions have stochastic effects. Even if states of the system
(and thus action outcomes) are fully observable—as they
might be in a Markov decision model—it is unlikely that
agents will have access to the actual action another agent
attempted (and hence the “intentions” of the other agent).
We focusourattentionongames where actionsare stochas-
tic, and actions are not directly observable. In general,
agents can observe onlythe state resultingfrom the actions
of the group of players; but they can use this observation
toassess the probabilitythat otheragents performed partic-
ular actions. The introduction of this type of uncertainty
and partial observability is rather simple to model, but it
hassomerathersurprisingeffectsonconvergencetocoordi-
natedactionintheBayesianbest-responsemodel,whichwe
examine here.We also adapt ﬁctitiousplaytothisunobserv-
able action setting through the use of likelihood estimates,
and show that convergence is generally much better than in
the Bayesian model.
Finally, we consider the problem of learning conventions
[9, 16]. One difﬁculty with stochastic games and models
that requireconstant learningis that a runof “bad luck”can
force agents out of a coordinated equilibrium. More seri-
ousare the computationalimplicationsofconstantlyupdat-
ing beliefs and computing a best response for every inter-
action. FollowingLewis [9], we take an interest inconven-
tional behavior. Agents should converge to a common un-
derstandingand, once realizingthat theyhave reached a co-
ordinatedequilibrium,shouldnever be forcedtoreconsider
how to act. Of course, care must be taken to ensure this
understandingis based on common knowledge, or globally
accessible information. To this end, we propose the use of
“globally accessible” likelihood estimates to rule out par-
ticular ways of acting, until only a conventional method of
acting remains whenever possible.
We describe the basic framework of coordinationgames in
Section2, as well as theirapplicationtomultiagentsequen-
tial decision processes (in the form of multiagent Markov
decision processes). In Section 3 we detail classic mod-
els from game theory for learning coordinated actions, in
particular ﬁctitious play and Bayesian methods. We also
pointoutthedifﬁcultyasymmetriccoordinationgamespose
for such methods. In Section 4, we extend these models
in rather obvious ways to deal with stochastic, partially-
observable actions. We study a number of properties of
these modelsandhowconvergence isaffected bythem. We
address the problem of convention in Section 5, proposing
anextensionofﬁctitiousplaydynamicswherebylikelihood
estimates for optimal joint actions are used to rule out pos-
sible courses of action.
Experimental results are provided to illustrate the perfor-
mance of these methods. We focus (primarily, not exclu-
sively)on
 
 
 gamestokeeptheexpositionclear; butmost
of the conclusions we draw can be applied more broadly.
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Figure 1: A Two-Agent CoordinationProblem
2 Coordination Games
2.1 Single Stage Games
Wetakeas thebasicobjectofstudyan
n-playercooperative
stategame. We assume a collection
 of
n (heterogeneous)
agents, each agent
i
 
  having available to it a ﬁnite set
of individual actions
A
i. The game takes place at a given
state, at which each agent chooses (independently) an ac-
tion to perform. The chosen actions collectively constitute
ajointaction,thesetofwhichisdenoted
A
 
 
i
 
 
A
i. The
game also has a set of outcomes states
S: each joint action
causes a transitionto some outcome state
s
 
S according
to a ﬁxed distribution. We use Pr
a
 
s
  to denote the prob-
ability of outcome
s when the joint action
a has been exe-
cuted. Finally, we associate a utility
U
 
s
  witheach
s
 
S.
Intuitively,each agent receives reward
U
 
s
  if the joint ac-
tionadoptedbytheagentsresultsin
s; thegameisthusfully
cooperative, for agents cannot do better by making things
worse for others.
2
We note that state games are essentially single-stage exten-
sive form games; but it is convenient to sometimes convert
them to the corresponding strategic form (or their normal
representation) [12]. Each joint action
a can be associated
with its expected utility,
P
s
 
S Pr
a
 
s
 
 
U
 
s
 , and states
can be done away with, resulting in a strategic form game.
However, the existence of distinct outcome states is crucial
in the learning models we adopt below. In particular, the
states provide indirect information about action choices in
cases whereactionsarenotdirectlyobservable. Conversion
to strategic form precludes the use of this partial informa-
tion; however, when actions are perfectly observable, we
will often use strategic form.
As an example, consider the
 
 
  game illustrated in Fig-
ure 1, in which two agents,
A and
B, can move left (
l) or
right (
r) (say, toward a particular goal). The agents are
rewarded with utility
  if they both end up in the same
location—eitherboth left (
s
 ) or both right (
s
 )—and util-
ity
  otherwise. The actions available to the agents are
stochastic, so that if
A executes action
l, it will end up in
the left location withprobability
 
 
  and in the oppositelo-
2A general
n-person state game simply requires that
U take
agentsasargumentsaswell asstatesto allow for competition; i.e.,
U
(
s
 
i
) denotes the utility of state
s to agent
i.cation with probability
 
 
 . This results in the transition
matrix shown. Should we convert this game to strategic
form, the Payoff Matrix 1 describes the expected utilityof
the given joint actions. We will also have occasion to use
the deterministic versionof thisgame, where each jointac-
tion has the obvious outcome: Payoff Matrix 2 character-
izes this game. We note that in the deterministic game, an
agent observing the outcome state is equivalent to observ-
ing its companion’s action directly.
Given such a game, we want the agents todiscover an opti-
mal course of action. Unfortunately, the optimal action for
eachagent generallydependsonthechoicesofotheragents.
Thetypicalsolutionconceptadoptedingametheory,thatof
a Nash equilibrium, allows us to break out of potential cir-
cularities as follows.
Arandomizedstrategyforagent
iat state game
Gisa prob-
ability distribution
 
 
 
 
A
i
  (where
 
 
A
i
  is the set
of distributionsover the agent’s action set
A
i). Intuitively,
 
 
a
i
  denotes the probability of agent
i selecting the indi-
vidual action
a
i when playingthe game. Astrategy
  isde-
terministic if
 
 
a
i
 
 
  for some
a
i
 
A
i.
A strategy proﬁle for
G is a collection
 
 
f
 
i
 
i
 
 
g
of strategies for each agent
i. The expected value of acting
according to a ﬁxed proﬁle can easily be determined. We
notethat ifeach strategyin
  isdeterministic, we can think
of
  as a joint action, since each agent’s action is ﬁxed. A
reduced proﬁle foragent
i is a strategy proﬁleforall agents
but
i (denoted
 
 
i). Given a proﬁle
 
 
i, a strategy
 
i is a
bestresponseforagent
iiftheexpectedvalueofthestrategy
proﬁle
 
 
i
 
f
 
i
g is maximal for agent
i; that is, agent
i
could not do better using any other strategy
 
 
i.
Finally, we say that the strategy proﬁle
  is a Nash equi-
librium iff
 
i
 
  is a best response to
 
 
i, for every
agent
i. In other words, the agents are in equilibrium if
no agent could expect a better outcome by unilaterally de-
viating from its strategy. In general, the interests of dif-
ferent agents can conﬂict, making equilibrium determina-
tion quite difﬁcult. However, in fully cooperative games
each agent expects the same reward and can easily deter-
mine an interesting set of equilibrium proﬁles as follows.
We ﬁrst convert the state game to strategic form (by taking
expectation of outcome utilities). Any joint action whose
expectedvalueismaximal isa(deterministic)Nashequilib-
rium. Such an equilibriumis called an optimal joint action
(OJA).Iftheagentscoordinatetheirchoicesso thattheyse-
lect an OJA, they are behaving as well as possible.
To illustrate with our example problem (in either the deter-
ministicor nondeterministicversion), we see that the OJAs
are
h
l
 
l
i and
h
r
 
r
i. These strategy proﬁles offer maximal
expected utilityfor both agents. We note however that be-
ingin equilibriumdoes not guarantee the agents are behav-
ing optimally (in a joint sense). The proﬁle in which each
agent adopts a randomized strategy that selects
l and
r with
equal probabilityis also an equilibrium: given that agent
A
chooses
l or
r,each withprobability
 
 
 ,
B hasnoincentive
tochangeitsstrategy(similarlyfor
A). Butthisrandomized
equilibriumis suboptimal,foritsexpected value ishalf that
of the optimal equilibria.
Nash equilibria, unfortunately, do not solve the coordina-
tion problem. While the agents can determine the OJAs
quite readily, the problem remains: how do they decide
which OJA to adopt? In its most general form, this is pre-
cisely theproblem ofequilibriumselectionstudiedingame
theory [12, 5]. We take the coordinationproblem to be that
of ensuring agents select individual actions that together
constitutean optimal or coordinated equilibrium,or OJA.
3
2.2 Multiagent MDPs
While ourfocus is onsimple repeated state games, ourmo-
tivation is not primarily the solution of repeated, single-
stage decision problems. In [2], we propose multiagent
Markov decision processes (MMDPs) as a framework in
which to study multiagent cooperative planning (in deci-
siontheoretic contexts). Roughly,MMDPs are Markov de-
cisionprocesses [7,14, 3]inwhichactionsat each stageare
comprised of distinct components performed by individual
agents. The aimthereisnottocoordinatesinglestatestrate-
gies per se, but to construct coordinated policies for ongo-
ing behavior in different states.
Producingcoordinatedpoliciesisdifﬁcultcomputationally;
but one can gain considerable leverage by decomposing
the problem into distinct state games of the type described
above, with one game for each state (of a certain type) of
the MDP. The coordinationproblem is then reduced to that
of coordinating locally at each of these state games. In [2]
weassumethatagentscancomputethevalueofcoordinated
(ongoing)policies at individual states.
4 These “long term”
values are used as the outcome utilities in the individual
state games. If the agents are able to coordinate locally at
each of the state games deﬁned in this way, we can guaran-
tee that they will implement an optimal (sequential) policy
[2]. Of course, in an MDP of sufﬁcient horizon,agents will
repeatedly encounter the same (or similar) states. For this
reason, coordination at single-stage state games has an im-
portant application to multistage (especially “process ori-
ented”) decision problems.
3 Learning with Observable Actions
Solutions to the coordination problem can be divided into
three general classes, those based oncommunication, those
based on convention and those based on learning. For ex-
ample, agents might communicate in order to determine
3We note that optimal equilibria need not be deterministic
OJAs. E.g., if
A had another action
m that behaved similarly to
r, then it could randomize between
m and
r; and if
B adopted
r,
an optimal equilibrium would result. However, we will continue
to speak as if optimal equilibria are OJAs.
4In other words, they can compute the value function of the
Markov decision process [7, 14]. We refer to [2] for a discus-
sion of the details, beneﬁtsandcomputationalimplications of this
assumption.task allocation [18, 17] or simply inform one another what
actions they will choose. Conventions (or social laws)
might be imposed by the system designer so that optimal
joint action is assured [9, 16]—intuitively,a conventionre-
stricts(orforces)considerationtoasubset offeasibleorop-
timal jointactions (such as the conventionof drivingonthe
right hand side of the street). Finally, coordinated action
choice might be learned throughrepeated playof the game,
either with the same agents [4, 8, 10] or a random selection
of similar agents [1, 15, 11, 19].
We focus here on learning models in which agents repeat-
edly interact with the same set of players in state games.
In this section, we assume that each agent can observe the
actions of the others at each interaction. Intuitively, each
agent uses its past history to form an estimate of strategies
used bythe otheragents. At each interaction,or play of the
game, an agent will choose a best response action to exe-
cute, given itspredictions(or beliefs)about the behaviorof
the other agents. Once the game is played, the agent can
observe the actual actions chosen by the other players and
update its beliefs regarding future play accordingly.
3.1 Fictitious Play
One of the simplest learning models for repeated games
is ﬁctitious play [13]. Each agent
i keeps a count
C
j
a
j,
j
 
 
 
a
j
 
A
j, of the number of times agent
j has
used action
a
j in the past. When the game is encountered,
i treats the relative frequencies of each of
j’s moves as in-
dicative of
j’s current (randomized) strategy. That is, for
each agent
j,
i assumes
j plays action
a
j
 
A
j with proba-
bility
C
j
a
j
 
 
P
b
j
 
A
j
C
j
b
j
 . This set of strategies forms a re-
ducedproﬁle
 
 
i, forwhichagent
i adoptsabest response.
After the play,
i updates its counts appropriately, given the
actions used by the other agents.
Thisverysimple adaptivestrategyis notguaranteed tocon-
verge to equilibriumin general, but will converge for two-
person zero-sum games [13]. More importantly, the meth-
ods of Young [19] can be applied to our simple coopera-
tive games to show that it is guaranteed to converge to a
coordinated equilibrium (that is, the probability of coordi-
nated equilibriumafter
k interactionscan be made arbitrar-
ily high by increasing
k sufﬁciently). We simply require
that an agent randomize between all pure best responses
when more than one is available.
5 It is also not hard to see
that once the agents reach an equilibrium,they will remain
there—each best response simply reinforces the beliefs of
the other agents that the coordinated equilibrium remains
in force. We do not discuss rates of convergence or experi-
ments, since the model is similar to the particular Bayesian
methods we describe next.
5Wealsorequirethatutilitiesberationalsothattheopportunity
to randomize arises (see below).
3.2 Bayesian Best-Response Model
A popular method for learning to select equilibria assumes
that agents have a prior beliefs, in the form of a probabil-
itydistribution,over the possible strategies of other agents,
use Bayesian update this adjust their priors as experience
dictates, and adopta best responseat each interactionbased
on theircurrent beliefs [8, 4]. Inrepeated games, one could
(and should) technically have priors over another agent’s
sequential strategy, including how it might react to one’s
current moves in the future [8]. However, the practical dif-
ﬁcultiesofspecifyinganythingbutthesimplest priorsisev-
ident; this also runs contrary to the spirit of decomposing
sequential problems intostates games (Section 2.2). So we
restrict attention to beliefs about single-stage strategies for
the state game
G.
We assume each agent
i has an prior distribution over the
strategies that could be adopted by other agents. The be-
liefsofagent
iaboutagent
j arerepresentedbyaprobability
distributionover the set of (randomized) strategies
 
 
A
j
 
agent
j mightadopt. We denotebyBel
i
 
j
 
 
j
 
s
  thedegree
of belief agent
i has that
j will perform strategy
 
j.
As a general rule, any reasonable prior could be used (pro-
vided it does not rule out the choice of some action in the
stategame). However, wewillconsideronlythecase where
each agent uses a simple prior, the Dirichlet distribution.
This can be represented witha small number of parameters
and can be updated and used quite easily. Let
n be the car-
dinality of
j’s action set. Agent
i’s beliefs about
j are rep-
resented by the Dirichlet parameters
N
j
1
 
 
 
 
N
j
n, capturing
a density function (see [6]) over such strategies. The ex-
pectation of
kth action being adopted by
j is
N
j
k
P
N
j
i
. In-
tuitively, each
N
j
k can be viewed as the number of times
outcome
k (in this case action
k) has been observed. The
initial parameters adopted by agent
i represent its prior be-
liefsaboutagent
j’sstrategy. Forsimplicity,weassume that
prior parameters are set uniformly (e.g., at
 ), reﬂecting a
uniformexpectationforeach of
j’sactions(thisisnotauni-
form prior over strategies, of course).
Asinﬁctitiousplay, at each interactionagent
ishouldadopt
a best response based on its current beliefs. Instead of a
strategy proﬁle, agent
i has a distribution over individual
strategies and an induced distribution over proﬁles. How-
ever, the Dirichlet parameters permit the expectation of in-
dividualmoves,andhenceabestresponse, tobedetermined
easily. When the interactionhas ended,
i updates itsbeliefs
by incrementingthe parameters
N
j
k (where agent
j was ob-
served to perform its
kth action).
6
6It is important to note that the agents are updating as if the
sampled distribution were stationary, which it is not. Thus, con-
vergence must be ensured by properties of best responses. We
also note that the conclusions we draw below regarding the per-
formance of Bayesian learning (versus ﬁctitious play) are not in-
tendedto denigratethe Bayesianmethod. Thefact is we are using
priors about “initial” strategies asif they were beliefs aboutthe ﬁ-0
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ious Sizes. All results averaged over 30 trials.
In our example above (assuming observable actions), we
mightsettheinitialbeliefparameters ofbothagent
Aand
B
to
h
 
 
 
i (they each expect the other to go left or right with
equal probability). Thus, theywilleach randomizebetween
l and
r uniformly. Iftheresultofthisrandomizationiscoor-
dinated (e.g., joint action
h
l
 
l
i), both update their distribu-
tiontobe
h
 
 
 
i. At thenext interaction,bothwilladopt
l as
a best response and reinforce the initial choice. It is easy to
see that the OJA
h
l
 
l
i is guaranteed to be selected forever.
However, suppose the initial randomization results in the
joint action
h
l
 
r
i. In this case, their updated beliefs will be
different:
A’s parameters
h
 
 
 
i indicate
B will again per-
form
r, while
B’s
h
 
 
 
i indicate the opposite. There is no
chance of coordination at the next interaction: the action
will be
h
r
 
l
i(each switches actions). Their updatedparam-
eters willeach be
h
 
 
 
iat thispointand randomizationcan
again take place providing another chance to coordinate at
the third interaction.
It is not hard to see that, in this example, the agents have
the opportunity to randomize at every second interaction,
and the chance of coordination at each such round is
 
 
 .
The probability that the agents fail to converge by round
k (i.e.,
 
 
 
b
k
2
c) therefore decreases exponentially with
k.
To illustrate, Figure 2 shows experimental results for this
 
 
  games, as well as larger
n
 
n pure coordination
games.
7 The
x-axis shows the number of times the game
has been encountered, while the
y-axis shows the average
errorprobability—thechance anuncoordinatedjointaction
is adoptedusingtheagents’s best response strategies at that
point. In such pure coordination games, it is quite easy to
nal “coordinated” strategies. It is remarkable that this misuse of
Bayesianmethodology works at all.
7In each game there are
n agents with
n actions. The set of
movesis the samefor all agentsandthey are rewarded with value
ciftheyeachexecutethesamemove,andaregivenasmallervalue
d if they do not. Hence, there are
n OJAs.
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Figure 3: Convergence of
 
 
  Asymmetric Games. Each
game has a reward of 1 for one uncoordinated joint action,
zero fortheother, andthereward indicated(1, 4,10, 20)for
coordinated actions. All results averaged over 1000 trials.
see that convergence toan optimaljointaction willbe quite
rapid. For instance, in the
 
 
 
 
  game coordinationis all
but assured by the fourth play of the game.
8
The rate of convergence can be adversely affected if the
game is not symmetric. For example, consider the asym-
metric
 
 
  game given by:
l(B) r(B)
l(A) 4 1
r(A) 0 4
Should the agents start with prior parameters
h
 
 
 
i repre-
sentingtheirbeliefsabouttheother’smoves, then
A’sinitial
best response is
l, while
B’s is
r. The agents will not have
the chance to coordinate their actions until they can ran-
domize among theirpure best responses—when
A assesses
the probabilityof
r (for
B) to be
4
7 (or
B assigns probabil-
ity
4
7 to
l). Given the integer nature of the updates, this can
onlyhappenatthesixthinteraction,andeveryseventhinter-
action after that. Thus, the rate of convergence (while still
exponential) is slowed linearly by a factor of seven. To il-
lustrate the nature of these “plateaus”, see Figure 3: values
otherthan
 (inthe matrixabove) are shown,alongwiththe
original
 
 
  symmetric game.
Proposition 1 Let
G be a
 
 
  coordination game, with
a denoting the utilityof coordinated action, and
b
 
c denot-
ing the utility of the two uncoordinated actions. Assuming
uniformDirichletpriorparameters
h
 
 
 
i,theprobabilityof
failingto reach convergence at round
k is
 
 
 
 
b
k
g
c
 , where
g
 
g
c
d
 
 
a
 
c
 
 
 
a
 
c
 
 
 
a
 
d
 
 .
8In fact, for larger valuesof
n, faster convergenceis dueto the
likelihood that the eachrandomizationis more likely to producea
unique “most likely” (or majority) coordinated action.Thus convergence is slowed linearly by the factor
g. This
can be extended to noninteger utilities in the obvious way;
as long as the utilities are rational, convergence is guaran-
teed. We also note that nonuniform priors have littleeffect
here, andthat more heavilyweightedpriorsdo notpreclude
convergence, but can force a certain minimum number of
encounters before coordinationis possible.
4 Learning with Unobservable Stochastic
Actions
The key difﬁculty with the models described above is the
assumption that actions can be observed. As described at
the outset, agents will typicallybe able to observe only the
outcomes of these actions, and not the actions themselves.
However, since the agents all know the game structure, the
observationstheymake stillprovideevidence regardingthe
choices made byotheragents. Onesimplyneedstoaccount
for the inherent uncertainty in this information.
It is worth notingthat, in general, there must be a sufﬁcient
number of observable states that can be used to distinguish
(probabilistically) which joint actions have been executed
for useful learning to take place. For instance, suppose we
havesimplematrixgame whereagentsmovetoagoodstate
orabadstate. Iftheycan’tobservetheactionchosenbyoth-
ers when moving to a bad state, then they can’t tell which
oftheuncoordinatedmovesotheragentsdid(i.e., verylittle
informationisavailable fromwhich tolearn). Ourperspec-
tiveisnot so much that agentshave a choice ofactionsthat,
correctly chosen, take them to a (single) good state (which
is one interpretation of strategic form); rather they have a
choice ofpossiblegoodstates, andtheiractionsmust be co-
ordinated in the sense of agreeing on the state they “aim”
for. (These are, of course, extreme points on a spectrum.)
4.1 Bayesian Best-Response Adapted
The Bayesian best-response model we described above can
be adapted to the case of unobservable stochastic actions
in a rather straightforward way. As before, we assume
agents use Dirichlet distributionsover the strategies of oth-
ers to represent their beliefs. While belief parameters can-
not be updated directly with observation of a particular ac-
tion, agent
i can update its beliefs about
j’s strategy by a
simpleapplicationofBayes rule. Agent
iﬁrst computesthe
probability that
j performed
a for any
a
j
 
A
j, given the
observed state
s and its previous action
a
i:
Pr
 
a
 
j
 
 
a
j
j
a
 
i
 
 
a
i
 
t
 
 
Pr
 
t
j
a
 
j
 
 
a
j
 
a
 
i
 
 
a
i
 Pr
 
a
 
j
 
 
a
j
 
Pr
 
t
j
a
 
i
 
 
a
i
 
Here
a
 
j
  denotes
j’s component of a joint action
a. The
prior probabilities are computed using agent
i’s beliefs
Bel
i
 
k
 
a
k
 
s
  for arbitrary agents
k and the joint transition
probabilities. Agent
i then updates its distributionover
j’s
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Figure 4: Convergence of
 
 
  Stochastic, Unobserv-
able Action Games. The probabilityof (individual) action
failure (
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 )is shown. All results averaged
over 1000 trials.
strategies using this “stochastic observation;” in particu-
lar
N
j
k is incremented by Pr
 
a
j
k
j
t
  (intuitively, by a “frac-
tional” outcome).
9
In the stochastic version of our example, let
A and
B adopt
the initial parameters
h
 
 
 
i. If the initialrandomization re-
sults in coordinated joint action (e.g.
h
l
 
l
i), and the prob-
able outcome
s
1 results, coordination is assured forever.
However, suppose the ﬁrst joint action is
h
l
 
r
i and it has
its most likely outcome
s
4. Then
A’s belief parameters be-
come
h
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i and
B’s
h
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i. The best response at
the next interaction is
h
r
 
l
i, resulting in updated parame-
ters
h
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ifor
A and
h
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ifor
B (assum-
ing the expected outcome). Unlike the deterministic case,
the agents will not be able to randomize or coordinate. In
fact, givenanysequence of“mostlikelyoutcomes,” itisnot
hard to see that
A and
B will never coordinate, unless they
do initially. Fortunately, this cycle of suboptimal joint ac-
tions can be broken by an unlikely outcome (i.e., if one of
the actions “fails”). Experimental results for different fail-
ureprobabilitiesinthis
 
 
 scenarioareshowninFigure4.
These resultsillustratetherather“paradoxical” fact that the
less error prone (or more predictable) the available actions
are, the slower the agents are to converge. Indeed, one can
see that the stochastic actions play the role of “experimen-
tation”fortheseagents, atechniqueusedingame theoryfor
agents to break out of suboptimal best response cycles.
1
0
Oneway toenhance convergence istohave agentsrandom-
9Thesefractional parameterscorrespondtothe expectationsof
a weighted combination of integer-parameter Dirichlet distribu-
tions that result from standard update using the positive probabil-
ity outcomes.
1
0Detailed,butstraightforward,analysisofconvergenceusinga
Markovchainmodelisprovidedinaforthcomingtechnicalreport.0
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Figure 5: Convergence of
 
 
  Stochastic, Unobservable
Action Games With
 -Best Response. Various values of
 
(
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 )areshown. Actionfailureprob-
abilityis
 
 
 
 . All results averaged over 1000 trials.
ize over
 -best responses [8]. This allows agents to ran-
domizeamongactionsthatareclosetobeingbest responses
giventheircurrentbeliefs. Intheexampleabove,thebeliefs
of the agents “hover” around the point at which they will
randomize—allowing
 -bestresponsesgivestheagentsam-
ple opportunityto break out of such cycles. This results in
slightlybetter convergence in this example (see Figure 5).
4.2 Fictitious Play Adapted
Finally, we note that ﬁctitious play can be adapted to the
setting of unobservable stochastic actions with good suc-
cess. Unlike the Bayesian model, we cannot rely on priors
to estimate the probability a given action was performed.
Instead we use likelihood estimates as a means of updat-
ingfrequencycountsina waythat accounts forthestochas-
tic aspect of observations. When an outcome state
s is ob-
served, each agent
i determines Pr
a
 
s
  foreach jointaction
a (this is just part of the agent’s model). The relative likeli-
hoodof
aisPr
a
 
s
 
 
P
b Pr
b
 
s
 , where
aand
barerestricted
to range over joint actions such that
a
 
i
 
 
a
i,
b
 
i
 
 
a
i
(i.e.,
iusestheknowledgeofitsownselectedaction
a
i). Us-
ing these likelihoods,
i computes the likelihood that
j per-
formed individual action
a
j to be
P
fPr
a
 
s
 
 
a
 
j
 
 
a
j
g
P
Pr
a
 
s
 
(again,
a
 
i
 
 
a
i is assumed). The likelihoodestimates for
each of these individualactions are used toupdate agent
i’s
frequency counts.
In our example, frequency parameters are updated by
 
 
 
or
 
 
  for every possible outcome. This allows agents to
randomize much more frequently, and is comparable to the
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Figure 6: Convergence of
 
 
  Games using Bayesian
Learning, Stochastic Fictitious Play, and Fictitious Play
with Conventions. Action failure probability is
 
 
 
 . All
results averaged over 1000 trials.
action observable setting(for this example, not in general).
Convergence for this version of ﬁctitiousplay is compared
totheBayesianlearningmodelforthe
 
 
 game(Figure6),
and a more complicated
 
 
  game (Figure 7).
5 Conventions
Finally, we consider how true conventions might arise via
learning. The problem with all of the models above, in the
presence of stochastic actions, is that they cannot be said to
converge to a true convention in the sense discussed in the
introduction. By a conventional way of acting, we mean a
ﬁxed strategythat isappliedto a givensituationwithoutre-
quiring any special deliberation. The learning models de-
scribed all have a chance of “popping out” of equilibrium
(e.g., through a series of unlikely occurrences) though the
probabilityofthisgenerallydecreases quicklyover time. A
moreseriousdifﬁcultyisthattheagentsmust constantlyup-
datetheirbeliefsand“reconsider”theirchoice ofaction(by
recomputing possible best responses). This is certainly not
in the spiritof conventions, or ﬁxed rules of encounter, that
one must simply apply to a given situation.
Intuitively, we would like agents to adopt some criterion
that would allow them to identify that an optimal equilib-
rium has been reached, and that this realization is common
knowledge. In this way, agents will eventually stop“think-
ing” about how tobehave in a given state and simplyact.
1
1
It is important to emphasize the role common knowledge
1
1Adoptingaconventionin thissensedoesnotmeanthat agents
cannot adapt to changesin circumstance(e.g., the introduction of
new agents). This would be reﬂected by the fact that the agents
engage each other in a different state, for which the adopted con-
vention does not apply.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
0 5 10 15 20
E
r
r
o
r
 
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
Number of Interactions
Convergence of 3x3 Game with Fict. Play/Conventions
BL
FP
FP+Conv
Bayesian Learning
Fictitious Play
Fictitious Play with Conventions
Figure 7: Convergence of
 
 
  Games using Bayesian
Learning, Stochastic Fictitious Play, and Fictitious Play
with Conventions. Action failure probability is
 
 
 
 . All
results averaged over 1000 trials.
plays here. If an agents use personal knowledge in the de-
cision to jump to a conventional equilibrium (e.g., assess-
ing the probability of a joint action using knowledge of its
own action, or its personal prior), they risk adopting differ-
entconventions(andneverreconsidering),perhapsguaran-
teeing suboptimal behavior from that point on.
We propose a model based on our stochastic extension of
ﬁctitiousplay and have agents compute the likelihoodesti-
mate ofall OJAs(the“target”equilibria)giventheircurrent
observation. If any OJA
a has a higher likelihoodestimate
than
b,
b is “removed” from subsequent consideration. For
instance, consider our
 
 
  game. Suppose the agents end
upin thestate
h
l
l
i; regardless ofpast behaviorand what ac-
tual actions the agents performed, there is a unique OJA,
h
l
 
l
i, that has maximum likelihood. We notice that each
agent can determine thisindependent ofany personal infor-
mation, and is aware that others have this ability as well—
theOJAswithmaximumlikelihoodarecommonknowledge.
From this point on, the agents will perform
h
l
 
l
i, even if
the initial action they performed was
h
r
 
r
i, and by chance
it had this very unlikely outcome.
In a similar
 
 
  game, once could imagine that moving
to a certain state is most likelygiven two of the three OJAs
(e.g.,
h
 
 
 
 
 
iand
h
 
 
 
 
 
i),butisless likelygiventhe third
(e.g.,
h
 
 
 
 
 
i). When thisstate is observed, the agents will
reject
h
 
 
 
 
 
i as a potential equilibrium, will individually
neverconsiderperformingaction
 ,andwillneverconsider
a joint actioninwhich theother agents performed
 to have
positive probability at any future interaction: the rows in
the matrix correspondingto the components of the rejected
OJA will be effectively “deleted.”
Formally, conventions are added to a learning model (such
as ﬁctitiousplay) as follows. At each interaction(say inter-
action
k), each agent computes a likelihoodestimate LE
 
a
 
for each OJA
a, given the observed outcome (we note that
in ﬁctitious play, these are computed for all joint actions,
and willthereforebe availableanyway). The set MLE
 
k
 is
theset ofOJAsthathavemaximumlikelihood. Thegameis
thenalteredasfollows: anyaction
a
i
 
A
i thatdoesnotoc-
curinanyelement ofMLE
 
k
 is“deleted” fromthegame in
the sense deﬁned above. At interaction
k
 
 , coordination
is attempted for this reduced game. If we are fortunate, the
MLE set will eventually be pared down to a singleton (or a
set ofOJAswith“interchangeable”components)andacon-
ventionwillbereached thatcanneverbedropped. Thiswill
not always be the case, of course, as we discuss below.
Conventions based on maximum likelihood estimates can
be implemented “as is”, with each agent randomly choos-
ing actions and rulingout certain possibilitiesas warranted
byMLE. However, thisisunlikelytoworkwellinscenarios
with a sufﬁciently large number of outcomes, so that many
states have zero probability of being reached by any OJA
(e.g., imagine a
 
 
 
 
  game where only a small fraction
ofthe
 
 
1
0actionshavepositiveprobabilityofan“informa-
tive”outcome). Inthiscase, therate ofconvergence willbe
dictated by the probabilityof reaching an informative state
given a random joint action (which can be tiny in a case
likethis). We actually want to use learningtobias agent re-
sponses in order to increase the probability of an OJA (or
simply the chance of informative outcomes).
This is easily accomplished by grafting conventions onto
the learning models described above, having agents main-
tain personal estimates of other agents’s strategies and
adopt best responses. Thus convergence to OJAs will oc-
cur even ifMLE does not pruneactions. Inan extended ﬁc-
titious play model, this is straightforward. The only com-
plication lies in the deletion of individual actions from the
game: each agent
i must besure that,infutureupdatingand
computationofbest responses, theestimated frequenciesof
theactions deleted foragent
j are ignored. The relativefre-
quencies of the remaining actions form the basis of best-
response considerations at subsequent interactions.
Convergence for ﬁctitious play with conventions is com-
paredtostraightforwardﬁctitiousplayforourstandard
 
 
 
game in Figure 6, and a more complicated
 
 
  game in
Figure 7. In both cases convergence is enhanced, remark-
ably so in the
 
 
  case, where coordination is guaran-
teed after one interaction. Of course, this is an artifact of
thegame—each outcomestate has a uniqueOJAwithmax-
imum likelihood.
1
2 While convergence is enhanced, we
note that a more important function of conventions is their
roleintheeventualeliminationofthecomputationalburden
associated with ongoing computation of best responses.
1
2Informally, this game has six outcome states, three “good”
and three “bad”. Each good state corresponds to an OJA in the
sensethattheOJAlikelyleadstothatstate. If onlytwoofthethree
individual actionsare the same, there is a small chanceof moving
to the good state correspondingto the majority action, and so on.
Thegamewasactuallydesignedtopreventordinaryﬁctitiousplay
from converging too quickly!Wenotethatconventionswillnotgenerallyleadtoa unique
choice of OJA. For example, in a game with three OJAs,
wheretwoofthemleadtothesame outcomeswiththesame
probabilities,nothingcandistinguishthetwofromthepoint
of view of likelihood. In other words, each action outcome
accords the same likelihood to these two actions. In this
case, thelearningcomponent willchooseone ofthetwoac-
tions;but whileconventionaldeliberationsmay ruleoutthe
third, they must leave open the possibilitythat either of the
remaining two actions could be performed. In such a case,
conventions cannot be used to prevent agents from contin-
uing to update their beliefs.
1
3 However, in a case like this
conventionsstillplay a rolein restrictingattentioninlearn-
ing to particular possibilities, even if they cannot choose a
unique equilibrium. The analysis of conventions and their
effect on convergence is the subject of ongoing investiga-
tion and experimentation.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have studied several learning models from game the-
ory, and their extension to coordination problems with un-
observable actions. As we have seen, a number of differ-
entproblemfeatures,suchasymmetries inutilityandfailure
probabilities can have surprising effects of convergence to
a coordinated equilibrium. We have also proposed the use
of conventions as a means to restrict attention to particular
equilibria,insome cases allowingeventual relieffromhav-
ing to “think about” what action to perform.
The experimental results are not conclusive; rather they
are merely suggestive of interesting models for coordina-
tionlearning,modelsthatrequirefurtherexploration. How-
ever, some of these directions appear promising. In ad-
dition, the interaction of these methods in true sequential
decision problems consisting of a wide variety of related
state games is of considerable interest [2]. In this setting,
we are ultimatelyinterestedin thegeneralizationof learned
conventions across similar state games, exploiting struc-
tured(Bayes net) representationsof games and utilityfunc-
tions,as in[3]. Finally, generalizationsofthismodel, espe-
cially those where only partial common knowledge of the
game structure is assumed, will be required to make the ef-
fort more robust and realistic. This will require the use of
ideas from reinforcement learning and learning models of
dynamical systems.
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1
3In principle, onecandetectthis factbyanalyzingthelegalac-
tions remaining at any point in the game andseeingif they can be
distinguishedby likelihood estimates. If the agentsever reachthe
pointwhere(say,inthisexample)thetwoactionscanneverbedis-
tinguished, they can cease computing likelihood estimates, since
the impossibility of reaching a conventionhas been detected.
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